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Dicotomies And Dualities In Sociology Based On The Progressive History Thesis

İlerlemeci Tarih Fikri Ekseninde Sosyolojide Dikotomiler ve Dualiteler

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Abstract

Dealing with the developmental stages of social changes and going to the roots of the effects of these transformations and changes is the main subject of historical sociology. The method of historical sociology for this purpose is the study of classical sociological works. In this study, we have tried to analyse the thesis of progressive history in terms of conceptual dichotomies and dualities. This is done in order to penetrate into the intellectual background of the birth of modern sociology on the European continent as an event and to analyse the system of meanings in this background. As we know, the idea of creating a new society in Europe is one of the main factors that crystallised the existence of modern sociology. In general, the idea of transformation and change depends on a philosophical understanding, which has emerged in the name of innovation in Europe. It can be said that the most powerful of the philosophical foundations of this idea is the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and the thesis of progressive history is one of the theses with high functionality in the transformation of that period. One of the aims of this article is to evaluate the strong relationship between the birth of sociology and the progressive historical thesis through the founding/leading names, and to reveal the intellectual codes and patterns of the developing course of sociology. In order to realise this aim, an attempt has been made to make historical sociology by considering the dichotomous and dualistic concepts in the theories of Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Herbert Spencer, who lived in the countries of France, Germany and England where sociology was born and went down in history as the founding names of sociology.

Keywords: Progressive History Thesis, Dualities in Modern Thought, Historical Sociology.

Öz

Tarihsel sosyolojinin esas mevzuu toplumsal dönüşüm ve değişimlerin gelişim safhalarını ele almak ve söz konusu dönüşüm ve değişimlerin oluşturduğu etkilerin kökenlerine inmektir. Bu amaçla klasik sosyoloji eserlerinin incelenmesi tarihsel sosyolojinin metodunu oluşturur. Bizler bu çalışmada bir olay olarak modern sosyolojinin Avrupa kıtasında doğmasının

tarihsel oluşum bağlamlarına ve içinde filizlendiği toplumsal koşullara yön veren düşünsel arka planına nüfuz etme ve bu arka planda var olan anlam sistematüğını çözümleme adına ilerlemeci tarih tezini kavramsal dikotomiler ve dualiteler özelinde irdelemeye çalıştık. Malum olduğu üzere modern sosyolojinin varlığını billurlaştırın temel etkenlerden biri Avrupa'da yeni bir toplum yaratma fikridir. Avrupa'da yenilik adına ortaya çıkan dönüşüm ve deęişim fikri ise genelde felsefi bir anlayışa baęlıdır. Denilebilir ki bu fikrin felsefi temellerinden en güçlü olanı Aydınlanma felsefesi olduğu gibi söz konusu felsefi tartışmalar içinde de ilerlemeci tarih tezi o dönemin dönüşümünde işlevsellięi yüksek tezlerden biridir. Sosyolojinin doğuş seyri ile ilerlemeci tarih tezi arasındaki güçlü ilişkiyi kurucu babalar üzerinden deęerlendirmek ve sosyolojide gelişim seyrinin düşünsel kod ve kalıplarını açığa çıkarmak bu makalenin amaçları arasındadır. Söz konusu amacı gerçekleştirme adına Sosyolojinin doğduğu Fransa, Almanya ve İngiltere topraklarında yaşamış ve sosyolojinin kurucu isimleri olarak tarihe geçen Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx ve Max Weber'in kuramlarındaki dikotomik ve dualitik kavramlar ele alınarak tarihsel sosyoloji yapılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İlerlemeci Tarih Tezi, Modern Düşünce de Dualiteler, Tarihsel Sosyoloji

Introduction

From the fifteenth century onwards, the culture and beliefs of these communities shocked European society as a result of contact with the tribes and communities living in the regions discovered by traders. Faced with this, Europeans were forced to ask the following question: In the family of humanity descended from Adam and Eve, was there a place for these "godless savages"? Where did these alien cultures fit into God's plan, into the great chain of existing? These questions turned the basic dynamics of social life, such as religion and economics, upside down. At the same time, the hegemony of the church, the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy over these dynamics was about to collapse. However, there had to be a way out of the destructive effects of the social upheavals and radical changes that were occurring. Western philosophers believed that the destructive effects of

changes in the social structure could only be overcome by establishing the laws governing these changes, arguing that man could only triumph in his war against nature through practical reason. From these discussions emerged the progressive philosophy of history. (Calhoun, 2007: 80-84, Gurvitch, 50-51).

In the Middle Ages, for a thinking person, everything that existed made sense in a God-designed world. Predictions about time, space and empire were dominated by the divine. In such an image, man's existence was one of passivity with a limited range of motion. The Renaissance movement, which has its roots in the 14th century, encompasses the process in which many currents of thought emerged and flourished in an effort to liberate the activity of thought that was trapped in this one-dimensional picture of the meaning of existence and to liberate man from this passivity. One of the most important movements that was a feature of Renaissance thought was humanism. Humanism is, in a sense, the effort of the Renaissance man, who felt himself trapped in a passive existence, to free himself from the shackles of this passivity and to begin to practice being an "individual" in modern terms. From this point of view, humanism, while not excluding Christian dogmas, can be seen as the product of the desire to address the "human problem" without being under the pressure of those dogmas, and to investigate independently the "quiddity of the human being". It is not in the Middle Ages, but in Antiquity that we can find the historical guidelines for such research. The slogan that was used to guide the Ancients was "more man, less God". For in the cycle of history, which is dominated by the divine will, the human being was an insignificant part of a "divine mechanic". But there was no alternative but to rely on the principles of rationality, to question one's own reality on the basis of one's own inclinations and orientations, for man in his search for individuality. In this case, the desire to be an individual was not only valid for the individual human being, but also for the human communities that were becoming nations. (Özlem, 2001: 45).

Nature became an object to be approached with a secular perception when humanism was followed in Europe by pantheism, based on the idea that nature was identical with God. The final step in the detachment of man and his actions from the divine bond was the secularisation of the laws of history. According to this prediction, religion will continue to dominate

human beings and human societies as long as history is accepted as God's destiny board. Just as the effectiveness of the divine will becomes meaningless when we penetrate into the physical laws of the universe and of nature, so the cyclical laws of history, which are seen as the destiny of states and nations, have to be revised and freed from the yoke of God. In the final analysis, this endeavour was based on the need to shape the philosophy of the flow of time on the basis of an objective law of becoming in Europe. (Goldmann, 1999: 15-17).

The idea of progress, which was given an unlimited and inescapable structural content especially during the Enlightenment with the secularisation of Christian historical theology, is treated in natural philosophy as a law of development. It states that there is no permanence and continuity in the universe, but rather a continuous change towards the future. In the philosophy of history, on the other hand, it is the case that society is in a state of constant improvement, and that this improvement will ultimately lead to social and universal justice. (Özlem, 2005: 206).

The philosophy of history can be seen as a philosophical endeavour that begins with the questioning of the meaning of the events of the past and moves towards the entire past of humanity, that is, towards "world history". When this endeavour reaches a certain level, it makes it possible to obtain a generalising meta-view of the history of mankind and, of course, to establish a comprehensive philosophical system that embraces the entire history of mankind. Therefore, under the guidance of such philosophical systems (Özlem, 2001: 15), an attempt is made to explain the entire history of humanity. Even though today we are able to gain a great deal of information about societies that remain in the dusty pages of history through documentary science, diplomatic science and indirect sources like archaeology, these possibilities were not available to eighteenth-century Europe.

The social and cultural differences to which Europeans were exposed when they discovered the New World (the Americas) and the Orient ultimately accelerated the questioning of theological systems of thought and led to political revolutions that unleashed great social upheavals in Europe and brought about radical changes that continue to this day. In addition to

these political revolutions, the need for European people to understand the social upheavals caused by the transformation of the wheel of industry and production in a way unprecedented in the history of the world ultimately set in motion an irreversible process (Calhoun, 2007: 82). If we look at Western thought, there is no idea more successful and representative than the idea of progress in the nurturing of the self-image and hopes of modernity as the final point to be reached by this process.

1. The Philosophy Of History And The Idea Of Progress In The Thought Of The Enlightenment

The idea of the civilisation of a nation or of an organised community is shaped by the cultural, social and economic development that goes hand in hand with a certain sense of history. In the modern sense, the progressive thesis of history, although it grew and flourished in the cradle of Western civilization, was shaped on the basis of a defined sense of self or historical consciousness, and has continued its influence beyond its boundaries. From this point of view, the chaotic course of the West's encounter with the "other" was one of the main factors that made the progressive thesis of history an intellectual necessity, a material for scientific activity. For European states, the benefit of transoceanic trade networks was political and economic domination of different communities, in other words colonial activities. The fact that colonialism posed major problems in itself led a young discipline such as sociology, based on the progressive historical theory, to assume the mission of the expected savior. In this respect, the increase in transport and communication facilities with colonial activities made interaction with different types of societies inevitable. This situation brought to the surface in Europe theological and philosophical problems. Subsequently, the fact that theological explanations of the phenomenon of difference were far from satisfactory reignited debates that can be traced historically in the context of religion-science conflict. It is well known that, within the framework of the progressive understanding of history introduced by Descartes and brought to a certain consistency by Comte, the current versions of these heated debates are treated in European society. (Ritzer, 2012: 14).

The progressive philosophy of history is undoubtedly one of the intellectual foundations of modern thought and classical sociology. The idea of knowing the universal law of history, which appears as an attempt to question the possibility of verifying the reality of events and historical narratives, whether on a micro or macro scale, appears as the philosophy of history. It can be said that the transformation of this philosophy into an attempt to decipher the nature of social realities and social systems began with Plato and reached its apogee with Ibn Khaldun. The emergence of classical modern sociology on the stage of history with Comte's law of the three states was a similar process. One of the reasons for this situation can be explained by the fact that the field of society and state systems of the past remains untestable. Access to knowledge and theory in this field depends on history and, in particular, on its philosophy.

Ideas, right or wrong, are not only powerful factors in historical and cultural change. They also tend to reflect the colour and spirit of an era. Thus the history of ideas also helps us to understand "history". For we can neither define ideas nor get a glimpse of the spirit of the times without recourse to the intellectual history of ideas or concepts as condensed expressions of ideas. This is particularly true of the 'idea of progress', which offers broad and complex ideas about historical and cultural change (Bock, 2010: 59). Indeed, modern thought and the speculative designs of history derived from it, as well as the attempt to explain the organisation of time/space, would lack an important foundation if the idea of progress were not taken into account today. Moreover, the possibility of the attribution of any normative value to historical and cultural change disappears. It is for this reason that the idea of progress is a key concept in modern thought.

The dictionary meaning of the word "progress" is derived from the Latin word "progressus". In its early stages, the word meant "stepping forward", "physical march", "journey" and "progress", while in later periods it was used in the perspective of a series of successive events. On the other hand, although the word "progress" was initially used as a neutral expression describing a factual situation, by the eighteenth century it had taken on a value-expressing, prescriptive meaning. In this respect, the concept of progress, as the basic concept of Enlightenment thought, refers to a cumulative process that is

considered desirable, assuming that the next stage in successive social processes is always better and more qualified than the previous one, and therefore the one ahead will be superior (Williams, 2016: 295).

Comte, who saw progressivism as the basis of both a philosophy of history and the methodology of sociology as an idea, thus went down in history as the person who laid the foundations of the new science of the 19th century. He breathed a sigh of relief for the people of Europe who were overwhelmed by the long turmoil. Comte believed that the natural evolution of society would improve the situation. And this idea was good news for the people of Europe. Intellectual turmoil is the cause of social turmoil, according to Comte's theory of evolution or the law of three states. The turmoil is caused by previous systems of ideas (theological and metaphysical). These continue to exist in the final (positive) stage. It is only when positivism has gained complete control that social turmoil will end. This is an evolutionary process. There is no need to foment social upheaval and revolution. Positivism will come, but it will not come as quickly as some would like. (Ritzer, 2012: 14).

It can be said that the foundations of today's sociology were laid in the perspective of the thesis of progressive history. Today's sociology is based on dichotomies and dualities. The factor that led almost all the founding fathers of sociology to define the founding principles of the science of sociology in the embrace of the philosophy of history, especially the progressive philosophy of history, which is older than sociology, is undoubtedly the search for answers to questions such as: "What will be the end point of the course of humanity, where are we going as humanity, where is society going? (Gurvitch, 1985: 50-51).

Western sociology, based on the progressive thesis of history, the central paradigm of Enlightenment thought, has benefited from the intellectual possibilities of the philosophy of history. It has played an active role in revealing the difference between the modern type of society and the traditional types of society, and in legitimising the strong position of Europe in international relations. The visions of the future in the progressive thesis of history, which emerged as a powerful paradigm of Enlightenment thought, were carried into the following centuries by the great theories of sociology

that claimed to explain all societies on the fictional grounds of triadic classification and binary typification that emerged in the understanding of different societies (Bıçak, 2005: 35). According to George Gurvitch, who states that none of the founders of sociology could break away from the philosophy of history, which is older than sociology, this is because they sought answers to questions such as "What will be the end point of the course of humanity, where are we going as humanity, where is society going?". (Gurvitch, 1985: 50-51).

Progress theorists' views on the idea of progress differ on the basis of the assumptions that accompany the idea. However, it can be said that there is a consensus on the following basic assumptions: (1) a linear conception of time and the assumption that history has a meaning for the future; (2) the assumption of the fundamental unity of humanity, all called to develop in the same direction; and (3) the assumption that the world can and should be transformed, which means that man asserts himself as the sovereign master of nature (Benoist, 2008: 8). Another aspect is the assumption that progress is a movement from a simple to a complex structure. The progressive theories of progress in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provide strong evidence for this assumption. In general, in the simple stage, all members of a given society have the same values, beliefs and similar roles in the economic division of labor. The lack of specialization in the social system leads to economic inefficiency and therefore material gain, innovation and production are low. So much time is spent on survival that innovation and progress in knowledge is also slow. Change becomes faster as the division of labour becomes more complex and specialization increases on both material and ideal levels. For example, Tönnies uses this assumption in his work *Community and Society* (see Tönnies, 2019). Tönnies argues that society has evolved from a natural cluster, the community, held together by natural will and manifested in the institutions of family and religion, to a complex structure, the society, held together by rational will and an artificial structure in which the economy is the dominant institution.

We can say that a thinker has arrived at a comprehensive concept of progress if he asserts that the human condition has changed and developed from a simple to a complex structure; if he assumes that it has done so

throughout history, is doing so now, and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future. But the term that determines whether this definition applies to a theory of degeneration or to a theory of progress is "improving". Improving' is a highly subjective and ambiguous term. For example, a machine that could increase production or a medical discovery that could prolong human life was generally agreed to be an "improvement" by nineteenth-century thinkers of progress (Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer). But Spengler doubted the value of hyper-efficient production. He thought it would lead to the decline of the West (Nisbet, 1980: 34-36). Similarly, Malthus denied that longevity was an improvement. He argued that it would only exacerbate the impending population explosion.

2. Dichotomies and Dualities

The term dichotomy literally means "division into two, distinction". It is used to describe the parts that are created when a whole is divided into two. In the literature, it is used only to refer to "variables with two categories". It includes the meaning of "a variable that can only take two values from opposite sides". The concept of duality, on the other hand, refers to "two separate wholes which are not necessarily opposed to each other". (See Cambridge Dictionary, dichotomy and duality.) Thus, duality is more general, whereas dualism is philosophical (or even psychological). As a general concept, duality is defined as: "the quality or characteristic of being twofold-dichotomy [duality, dichotomy]". As a philosophical term, dualism is defined as "the view that the world consists of, or can be explained in terms of, two fundamental entities, mind and matter". As a psychological term, it is defined as "the view that mind and body function separately, without one substituting for the other". There are also two other definitions of dualism as a theological term, as follows (The American Heritage College Dictionary, 1993: 423).

In philosophical thought, dualism refers to the existence of two principles that are opposed to each other and that cannot be reduced to each other in any area. The concept of dualism in its philosophical form was first explored by the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras. In the religious beliefs of older societies, however, the dualistic understanding of existence can be found. As a religious

theme, dualism appears as a doctrine based on opposites such as good and bad, good and bad, soul and body, life and death, world and hereafter, devils and angels (Hançerlioğlu, 1982: 177). It is one of the most important characteristics of the Western way of thinking. The dichotomous way of thinking began with Plato's separation of logos and mythos in favour of logos. It reached its peak with Hegel. Plato's ideal doctrine is based on the distinction between the "visible world" and the "ideal world". Plato undertook what he called an expedition from the temporary to the permanent, that is, from the concrete to the abstract. He paved the way for conceptualisation by moving to generalisation through the abstraction of objects from the concrete, the particular and the unique. The problem here is: In the name of Plato's doctrine of "ideas", "concept" is operated as a definition of form independent of existence. In this sense, conceptualisation is a mere attempt at abstraction. It creates a duality with the concrete and cuts its connection with the concrete. The reason for this is that all the objects that are related to this concept are gathered together under one roof. This causes us to lose sight of the differences between similar objects, and perhaps even before that, it destroys the realistic/real relationship between named and named. Ancient Greek philosophy is characterised by this concern with abstraction.

Metaphysical thought, embodied in dichotomies such as nature-culture, action-structure, individual-society and mind-body, has dominated all Western thought since Plato. The relationship between these dichotomous structures is based on a hierarchical order of precedence. It is only through this hierarchy that the strategic superiority of reason over myth, of the universal over the particular, of the abstract over the concrete, of the intellect over the irrational, of meaning over matter, of this world over the next, of the subject over the object, of science over religion, of reason over emotion or revelation, and of secular religion over secular religion can be achieved. Derrida claims that Western metaphysics and the structure of language are based on this hierarchy between pairs of terms and draws attention to the need for a break with this structure. Metaphysical thought has been inherent in Western thought since Plato, based on the ideal of "one truth". In metaphysical thought based on a foundation, an essence, a first principle, believing and knowing are based on opposing values. In the end, it is these

oppositions of values which are the most important elements in the support of this metaphysics of thought. Looking at the meaning of the concepts of dichotomy and duality, we can see that they are shaped by a number of binary structures on the axis of the progressive idea of history. In this respect, it can be said that the progressive thesis of history (tradition-modernity, individual-society, religion-rationality/reason) is explained in terms of three major dichotomies or dualities.

2.1. Tradition-Modernity

Anything that has survived for at least three generations, regardless of its institutional position, is tradition, if we think of tradition as "something that has been handed down or bequeathed from the past to the present". It is impossible to be outside tradition in this sense. Pieper (1958: 474) summed up this impossibility admirably as follows. "What the animal lacks, in contrast to the human being, is not knowledge, but tradition. Tradition as the ability to pass on and transmit the products of the mind from generation to generation, and thus to preserve, increase and enrich them from generation to generation. Conservatives have conservative habits, socialists have socialist habits, liberals have liberal habits, and even revolutionaries who declare war on tradition have revolutionary habits. It was, however, the dogmatic use of tradition that the French revolutionaries of 1789 and the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which formed their theoretical consciousness, sought to eradicate. So what is the dogmatic use of tradition that the French revolutionaries of 1789 sought to eliminate? Let us try to define and concretize it.

Looking at the concept of tradition, which means "passing on from generation to generation", "handing over", in terms of its root, we see that it has a sacred quality. Tradition is divinely rooted. Tradition is the main principle of the economy of salvation (Yves, 2004: 10): "Salvation begins with a sacred transmission, tradition. According to Josef Pieper, the divine will at the root of tradition first appears in classical antiquity. It takes concrete form in the "thinkers of antiquity" (ancients). The "thinkers of antiquity" to whom Pieper refers are certainly not the great philosophers. The "thinkers of antiquity" to whom Pieper refers are those who are close to the origin, the beginning, who have penetrated the realm of God. (Pieper, 2010: 25-28).

According to Pieper, this divine will, which we see in classical antiquity, was later revealed in the theology of Christianity. It was this sacred tradition, revealed in Christian theology, which was the source of divine order in the feudal community structure of the Middle Ages, and which the French revolutionaries of 1789 were in the process of eradicating.

This emphasis on history and tradition is, in fact, an emphasis on continuity. Tradition emphasises the continuity of history. At the heart of tradition, Oakeshott emphasises, lies the principle of continuing from past to future. Pascal's famous quote reveals this nature of tradition: "The succession of mankind through the centuries must be thought of as one and the same man, always present and always learning" (Yves, 2004: 3). Without any break in the continuity of social life, tradition means the spontaneous assimilation of the past in the understanding of the present, without considering the past as obsolete. What tradition and continuity do not accept is revolutionary change. That is, change that starts from scratch, radical change. The change that tradition and continuity are in favour of is rather a moderate change, that is a change that does not excessively challenge the order, a change that takes place with reference to the past.

The relationship between tradition and authority is the second point to mention. The moment we have a conversation about tradition, we also have a conversation about authority. "In Goethe's words, "When we speak of tradition, we must also speak of authority... authority is a kind of tradition" (Pieper, 2010: 23). Tradition has a coercive power, a binding power. As Gadamer notes (Gadamer, 2009: 25), what tradition sanctifies always has an unspoken authority. It is thanks to this authority that tradition subsists. The continuation of the existence of the tradition is through the taking on of a concrete form within the authority. "To crystallise tradition," says Jaspers, "within a strict authority is inevitable. The authority is in the service of a social need, in that it is the guarantor of the continuation of tradition over time. (Jaspers, 1969: 307).

In the Middle Ages, tradition took concrete form in intermediate institutions such as the church, the guild, the family and the nobility, within the feudal structure of the community, which drew its power from God. These

intermediate institutions are meant to carry and protect Tradition. It was these intermediate institutions which the French revolutionaries of 1789 wanted to eradicate, those which carried and protected tradition. That is why the revolution is the rejection of tradition (Camus, 2019: 250). The French Revolution of 1789 is recorded as a mass movement inspired by the Enlightenment. However, this bloody revolution pointed to a new social order by rejecting the historical experience and tradition of Europe. In the process, the French revolutionaries were declaring their rejection of tradition and the medieval feudal social structure that was the bearer of tradition. Terror and anarchy became the de facto character of the French Revolution as the streets of Paris turned into a bloodbath with this declaration. "The goal of creating an earthly paradise" and "the radical rejection of the past" are two fundamental ideas of the Revolution based on the paradigm of progress, and it is an undeniable fact that this paradigm was moulded within the philosophy of the Enlightenment. (Kabakçı, 2019: 121, 150, Slattery, 2015: 74, Comte, 2015: 299).

The French Revolution of 1789 is at the centre of the sociological analyses of both Comte and Durkheim. Comte and Durkheim were interested in the crisis caused by the French Revolutionaries of 1789 trying to create a new society. According to Comte, the efforts of the French revolutionaries of 1789 to create a new society caused moral and political anarchy (Comte, 1875: 111-114;) Similarly, for Durkheim, such an attempt caused a crisis because it destroyed the moral principles that provide order in society (Durkheim, 2017: 162-163). According to Durkheim, with the revolution, tradition lost its sovereignty, traditional moral principles that provided order in society disappeared, but new moral principles could not be substituted; therefore, the revolution created a sick society (Durkheim, 2006: 77). For Comte, the manifestation of this crisis was 'excessive individualism', in his view the disease of the age. (Comte, 2015: 237-238).

Both Comte and Durkheim looked to the Middle Ages for 'order', but both founding fathers sought to establish this 'order' through 'science', not traditional religion. When Henri Gouher said that Comte's aim was to find a man in whom there was no trace of God, he was in fact describing precisely his endeavour (Camus, 2019: 232). Comte admired the power of the Church, but what he admired in the Church was not the faith it represented, but its

power to unite society (Gray, 2013: 78). The same can be said of Durkheim. Durkheim sought an integrated, solidaristic society without traces of religion. When Durkheim glorifies Catholicism as opposed to Protestantism in his work *Suicide*, it is not its religious arguments that he glorifies, but rather the fact that it prescribes a set of compulsory practices for people to follow and creates a collectivity (Durkheim, 2006: 188). Or when he glorifies guildism, it is not its structure that he glorifies, but its moral principles that bring people together. (Durkheim, 1949: 34).

The aim of both Comte and Durkheim was the re-creation of moral principles that would bind people together, that would integrate people into society. The second volume of Comte's *Positive Politics* is devoted entirely to this subject. According to Comte, family, language, religion and the division of labour, as external forces controlling individual behaviour, will restrain individual selfishness, ensure the development of a common morality and thus build solidarity and unity (Comte, 2006: 150-160). In Durkheim's sociology, this function is carried out by the professional associations. According to Durkheim, professional associations will limit the selfishness of the individual and will ensure order through the establishment of basic moral principles and rules of behaviour (Durkheim, 2017b: 445). But these moral principles are certainly not those of medieval times. "Such an idea is utterly absurd," says Comte, "today the universe is filled with the mass of enlightened men... the reconstruction of the old system is, of course, a failure to understand the nature of the present crisis" (Comte, 1988: 51). Similarly, Durkheim argues that a return to traditional moral principles is impossible because, in his view, religion, the source of traditional moral principles, has lost its organising power in the modern age. (Durkheim, 2016: 26).

The understanding of history that shapes the modern use of revolution is the linear and progressive understanding of history. According to this understanding, history follows a linear, straight path that cannot be reversed, rather than a cycle of development and decay as in the classical period. According to this understanding of history, there has been the past, but this past has been negative, and history has progressed from the negative to the positive, or, as Hegel put the matter, towards the better and the capable (Hegel, 2016: 155). To better understand what the linear-progressivist

conception of history is, let us listen to Ulrich Im Hoff. With the progressive conception of history, "the voice", says Hoff, "now for the first time sounded not back but forward... For the first time, instead of the imaginary past, mankind was confronted with the imaginary future! (Hoff, 2004: 133).

In the linear-progressive understanding of history, history has a 'beginning' and an 'end'. The linear-progressive understanding of history owes its existence to the idea of a beginning and an end. History is a single flow from the beginning, which is man's fall from "paradise", to the "end", which is man's salvation, where a "new paradise" is built. Whereas history in the cyclic conception of history is the eternal recurrence of development and decline, history in the linear and progressive conception of history is a continuous linear development towards the 'end', the attainment of the paradise thought to exist from the outset. Kraus summarises this characteristic of the progressive conception of history in the following way "Origin is destination". (Löwy and Benjamin, 2007: 110).

Seeking to achieve this "end" reveals two fundamental features of the Progressive view of history. In the progressivist conception of history, history is a continuous linear line of progress. Therefore, it can be said that history is primarily a liberation from the past. In the progressivist view, the past is something to be left behind in order to build a new paradise. "Progress", says Bordoni, "means escaping from the past in the full hope of a tomorrow that will, in any case, go beyond the present" (Bauman, 2018: 156). However, the progressive view of history is not only an escape from the past. It is also an escape from the "now". The attribution of value to the future is not only a devaluation of the past, but also a devaluation of the present. The idea of a better future renders the present inadequate and unacceptable, as Rossi points out (Rossi, 2017: 61; Bauman, 2014: 25).

Therefore, the past and the present, which is a product of the past, are a disease that must be eradicated, in accordance with the idea of "progress". Second, history as continuous progress is the construction of a perfect future. It is based on the rejection of the past and the present. History has an "end" and this end will be only when and if the perfect society is in place. In contrast to the cyclical understanding of history, the main goal of the progressive

understanding of history is to create the perfect society, paradise. According to the idea of progress, repeating "the same" in the cyclical understanding of history is actually "hell". "The essence of Hell," says Benjamin, "is repeating the same, and the most terrifying paradigm of this is found ... in Greek mythology: Sisyphus and Tantalus are condemned to repeat the same punishment for all eternity". (Löwy, and Benjamin, 2007: 80)

Weber's "disenchantment" is the disorder caused by the French Revolution of 1789. But Weber's "disenchantment" is not, as noted above, a direct consequence of the French Revolution of 1789. Weber's "disenchantment" is a consequence of the rationalisation that came to dominate Western Europe to a greater extent with the French Revolution of 1789, which systematically transformed the modern world and continues to do so. Disenchantment took place with rationalisation. Rationalisation deprived the world of meaning and shattered human values, according to Weber. As society became more rational, the loving, hating, irrational and emotional elements in people disappeared (Weber, 2012: 341). This modern capitalist society, which destroys human values, removes irrational and emotional elements, in short, has a destructive quality for people, is Weber's problem, as Löwith notes (Löwith, 1999: 17). Indeed, Weber's aim was to fully reveal the nature of destructive modern capitalist society. Tracing the rationalisation that has systematically transformed and continues to transform the modern world, destroying human values and shattering the magical garden of man, is the main impulse that drives Weber's work.

Rationalisation is a process that encompasses all elements of social life in Weberian sociology. This process is a historical experience specific to Western Europe. Everything that is part of social life, such as law, economics, bureaucracy, politics, science, music, etc., is rationalised. In social terms, rationalisation is about the domination of the world by scientific reason. The systematic application of rational empirical knowledge in all areas has removed the magical aspect of the world and transformed it into a mechanism that is bound by the laws of objectivity (Aron, 2014: 387-388). Any belief in magic was undermined by the demand for objectivity. Rationalisation is linked to the secularisation of values in everyday life. In keeping with the spirit of modernity, the sacred values that shaped the traditional way of life

were abolished and replaced by secular values. In legal terms, the abolition of traditional legal principles and the replacement of these principles with rational legal principles have been the result. In political terms, there was the abolition of traditional patterns of sovereignty and the replacement of those patterns with rational patterns of sovereignty (Turner, 2014: 37-38). This process of rationalisation is, in the most general terms, the process of destruction of tradition, the community structure in which tradition takes concrete form, and its patterns, which can be seen in music, art, literature and all aspects of life. In the rest of the text, we will try to draw attention to the rationalisation of capitalism and bureaucracy by focusing on the rationalisation of law. We will look at the role of the French Revolution of 1789 in this process of rationalisation and its relation to tradition, the community structure in which tradition takes concrete form and its patterns.

The French Revolution of 1789 destroyed tradition, the community structure in which tradition takes concrete form, and its patterns. It destroyed the world of the sacred, intensified "disenchantment", and thus raised the problem of "order". We need to look at Weber's patterns of sovereignty in order to understand how the problem of "order" is shaped in Weber's sociology. For in order to understand a society, Weber's sociology needs to analyse patterns of sovereignty. Weber identifies three types of sovereignty, (1) conventional sovereignty, (2) charismatic sovereignty and (3) rational sovereignty. However, as Collins states, an examination of Weber's sociology in terms of 'order' reveals that there are two ways of maintaining order in society and placing human relations in a certain order (Collins and Makowsky, 2014: 113). Either traditional patterns of sovereignty or rational-legal patterns of sovereignty can achieve order in society.

2.2. Individual-Society

The Enlightenment idea of 'progress', and the idea of modern revolution of which it was the spirit, sought to build a new man and a new society. Condorcet formulated this basic doctrine behind the Enlightenment idea of "progress" as follows: "(Condorcet, 1990: 5) "The human race, and therefore society, is infinitely perfectible. This perfectibility means believing in the infinite progress of human beings, individually and socially, towards

physical, mental and moral perfection (Muller, 1985: 7). This belief was expressed by Condorcet, the secular prophet of the idea of progress:

"This is the object of the work I have undertaken, and its result is to show, by appeal to reason and facts, that nature has set no limit to the perfection of human faculties, and that the perfection of man is truly infinite and will continue independently of any power that would seek to stop it, and that its limit is nothing other than the life of the world on which nature has placed us". (Bierstedt, 2002: 36)

Here, in order to understand the problem better, we must ask the following questions: How is the human race, how is the society going to become perfect, perfect? How do we know how to progress towards a perfect society? Again, it is in Condorcet, the prophet of the idea of progress, that we find the answers to these questions. "Human perfection," says Condorcet, "will be achieved by advancing knowledge" (Condorcet, 1990: 28). Knowledge will enable humanity to eliminate its defects, according to Condorcet. With the progress of knowledge, all diseases can be prevented, defects can be eliminated and the human race can be perfected physically, morally and spiritually. This progress in knowledge, which perfects the human race, can also be the cause of social progress and the building of a "perfect" society. We can therefore say that progress in knowledge is the guarantor of the Enlightenment idea of 'progress' in the creation of a 'perfect' society (Condorcet, 1990: 30). Here, however, a different question arises: Before we consider how the Enlightenment idea of "progress", which seeks to create a "perfect" society, realizes this in the light of knowledge, we need to specify the kind of knowledge on which it rests.

"The first condition of order," says Nisbet, "is the existence of authorities who restrain the ambitions of men and control their wills" (Nisbet, 2011: 65). In the Middle Ages, social communities attempted to maintain order in society by acting as a buffer between the state and the individual on the one hand, and by producing moral codes to guide people through the control of their desires and wills on the other. Outside the social community, people cannot be defined as individuals. Man has no words or ideas of his own; he is in society and as an individual can only discover what is there. It is only

within these social groups that man can exist. As Burckhardt says, "Man is conscious of himself when he is in a family or an association" (Nisbet, 2011: 69).

The goal of maintaining order in a society in chaos has given rise to a new conception of society on the basis of reason and science: a sociological conception of society. In this conception of society, instead of the Enlightenment's individual-centred understanding, the myth of rational autonomy and the idea of the self-regulating individual, sociology adopted a perspective based on social groups, social authorities and intermediary institutions. "The great achievement of the early sociologists," says Nisbet, "... consists in their having formulated the problem of order... in such a way as to emphasise the theoretical value of small social groups". (Nisbet, 2011: 89).

Comte's more severe criticism of the Revolution was directed against the Enlightenment principle of the "society centred on the individual". For the structure of the community was destroyed by the revolution, which was based on the idea of an "individual-centred society". As we have seen, this destruction led to the alienation of the individual from himself, from society and from God. The individual was cut off from his roots and his sense of community. This society of isolated individuals in turn gave rise to "extreme individualism". This is the disease of the West today. In other words, the Revolution caused society to become fragmented. But 'the literal division of mankind into individuals...', says Comte, 'is nothing but an anarchic analysis, as immoral as it is irrational, which has the tendency to destroy social existence instead of explaining it' (Comte, 1875: 152). So what solution did Comte seek for the disease of 'excessive individualism' or 'moral anarchy' resulting from the Revolution's conception of 'individual-centred society'?

According to Comte, the fundamental problem in society is the problem of morals. In the French Revolution of 1789, the moral fabric of society was torn asunder. An external force that binds individuals together, makes them members of the community, and establishes authority over them, is the solution to this disease of moral anarchy caused by the Revolution. In the absence of an external reality that has control over the behaviour of individuals, the moral nature of individuals has an anarchic quality (Comte,

1875: 177). This external force will bind individuals together. It will ensure the development of a common morality. In this sense, Comte fought to establish a moral order in society (Benton, 2013: 45).

In particular, Durkheim attacked the Enlightenment concept of the "individual-centred society" and the idea of the social contract on which it was based. In fact, the concept of "individual-centred society" itself gave rise to the social ills caused by the Revolution. Durkheim criticises the Enlightenment conception of society based on the Enlightenment contract (Nisbet, 2013: 125-132), which is the sedimented model of all relations, as follows:

"... today it is very difficult to defend the concept of the social contract because it does not correspond to the facts. The investigator, as it were, does not see anything that could be regarded as indicative of it. There is no society that could have arisen from such a root, nor is there any society in whose structure there is the slightest trace of a contractual organisation. In other words, the social contract is neither a phenomenon that has appeared in history nor a tendency that has manifested itself in historical development. Therefore, in order to revive this idea and to give it some dignity, it has become necessary to call the participation of each individual who comes of age, which is necessary for him to live in the society in which he was born, a contract. But then every human enterprise that is not the result of coercion must be called a contractual relationship. According to this calculation, there should be no society, now or in the past, that is not based on a contract, because no society can survive on coercion alone". (Durkheim, 2006: 241-242).

The Enlightenment idea of an "individual-centred society" leads to the destruction of social groups that control the individual, so that the individual is unable to perceive anything superior to himself. This leads to "egoistic suicide". In contrast to "selfish suicide", "suicide of irregularity" is a consequence of the disorder and chaos caused by the revolution. According to Durkheim, "...the revolution, which demanded radical and sudden change, destroyed the regulatory power of society, which, through the abolition of the intermediary institutions that created moral codes, ensured the restraint of individual passions, and consequently gave rise to the suicide of lawlessness" (Durkheim, 2017b: 297).

According to Durkheim, the key to the solution lies in the creation of new 'social aggregates', i.e. social communities that will bind individuals more tightly together. The social diseases caused by the revolution will only be eliminated by the new moral codes that these social aggregates will form. In mechanical society, moral codes were constructed in a traditional way. Religion was the source of moral codes. However, with the transition from mechanical to organic society, religion could no longer fulfil this role. Religions lost their traditional regulatory power in modern times. This function of religion was taken over by science. Durkheim wanted to build a morality based on scientific foundations. According to Durkheim, new moral codes could only be constructed through science.

"... since it is impossible to revive the established beliefs, science is the only means we have left to fight against the disintegration of society" (Durkheim, 2017b: 300-302).

Durkheim believes that morality should be constructed on the basis of science. In fact, according to Durkheim, this should also be the aim of sociology. For Durkheim, sociology is a science of morality. Durkheim never gave up the idea that sociology should be a science of morality. According to Durkheim, while sociology constructs moral codes, it should treat moral events as things and examine them objectively, free from prejudice. Otherwise, no progress can be made. "The laws of society", including moral laws, says Durkheim, "do not differ in any way from the laws of nature, and no progress can be made unless it is recognised that the methods of discovering them are the same as those of other sciences" (Durkheim, 2014: 57-59).

Prioritising the individual, society, community clusters are an association of solidarity, a guide to basic values and norms based on collective consciousness. Society, community clusters are not the sum of their members; they express something much more than the sum of their members. If society, community clusters, were the sum of the individuals that make it up, and if collective consciousness were the sum of the individual consciousnesses that make it up, moral codes could not be created. This is because, according to Durkheim, just as "...each individual human being, taken individually,

possesses no moral value", it is also "impossible for many of these individuals to possess any moral value when brought together" (Durkheim, 2016: 85). Therefore, the construction of moral codes is only possible in society, in community clusters.

2.3. Religion-Rationality

In order to make the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which seeks to create a perfect society through reason, scientific reason, more comprehensible, we need to make a point by opening a parenthesis here. By doing so, both the concept of "progress" itself, the design of a perfect society as a product of it, and the role of reason, can be put on a more solid and concrete footing. First, it should be noted that the progressive conception of history did not emerge with the Enlightenment. The Judeo-Christian tradition of thought has much deeper roots in the progressivist conception of history. Therefore, Enlightenment thought is not a break with the past in terms of the understanding of history that it shaped; it is an imitation of the Judeo-Christian understanding of history (Güngörmez, 2014: 22-23), a secular imitation. Looking at the attitude and struggle of "progress" in the Enlightenment against the divine order, Christianity and the Church that constitute this order, we must note that although these efforts seem anti-Christian, they were originally shaped in the Christian tradition.

Before the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought, as mentioned above, a cyclical understanding of history prevailed. According to this, history consists of the eternal repetition of development and decline. With the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought, this understanding of history was abandoned. According to the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought, history is unique and can never be repeated. With this tradition of thought, history began to be understood as a unique flow from the fall of man to his redemption. History is the movement towards an "end" in which evil will be overcome. With this "end", salvation will be realised, the Golden Age will be experienced. "We see, then, that the eschatological thought in both Enlightenment and modern revolutionary thought is not unique to either Enlightenment or modern revolutionary thought. Rather, this eschatological thinking is a religiously specific way of

thinking. What the Enlightenment did was to rediscover eschatological thought in the Judeo-Christian tradition in a secular way (Nisbet, 1980: 48).

As products of a progressive understanding of history, both the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought and the Enlightenment and the modern revolutionary thought it shaped are based on the doctrine of salvation. But even though they are based on the doctrine of salvation, there is a very important difference between them. This difference has to do with the question of who is the subject of the realisation of salvation and how it is that salvation is to be realised.

In the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought, salvation is realised in the hereafter and by God. However, in the Enlightenment and modern revolutionary thought, salvation is realised in this world by human beings who take reason, abstract reason and scientific reason as their centre (Güngörmez, 2014: 11-16). The Enlightenment and the modern revolution endowed man with a messianic power. Man has become responsible for everything that will happen in the world; he has become both the judge and the criterion of judgement. Thus, while God was the subject of creation in the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought, man became the subject of creation in the thought of the modern revolution. Possessing the power of creation, man sought to become a partner in God's project by trying to build a perfect world and to become man-God. Dostoyevsky, in the persona of the revolutionary Kirillov in *The Lament*, deals with this with particular subtlety:

"All my life I have been tormented by God. Life is pain, life is fear, humanity is unhappy. There is nothing but pain and fear. But one day a new man will come, he will overcome pain and fear. The man who will overcome pain and fear will be God. That means a completely new man, a completely new life, everything will be new... Man will become God and ... the world will change, everything we do, our thoughts, our feelings will change" (Dostoevsky, 2019: 143).

So what is the fundamental force that makes man a partner in God's project, that transforms man into God? We see that the fundamental force that transforms man into God is reason. Reason has almost abolished the distinction between man and God. Man wanted to build an earthly paradise

by using reason. Therefore, in the Enlightenment and modern revolutionary thought, which wanted to create an earthly paradise, Reason itself took the role of God, and the spokesmen of this Reason took the role of the modern Jesus. This reason is abstract reason, scientific reason. Salvation can only be realised through scientific knowledge. In this sense, we can say that the Enlightenment is the heir of the "Gnostic tradition", a religion of "salvation", a tradition of "salvation". According to the Gnostic tradition, human knowledge is the way to escape the evil of this world, in other words, to organise heaven in this world. The Gnostic tradition is an attempt to establish the paradise imagined by the divine religions in the afterlife 'in this world' through 'knowledge' (Güngörmez, 2011: 6). The Enlightenment also sought to realise the doctrine of salvation in the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought through scientific knowledge shaped by a materialist and determinist philosophy. The Enlightenment therefore attacked the past, tradition and the experiential knowledge of tradition. The Enlightenment destroyed the past in order to organise paradise in this world through reason, scientific reason. In fact, Becker also drew attention to this point. "The philosophers of the eighteenth century," says Becker, "... demolished St Augustine's City of Paradise in order to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials (Becker, 1932: 31).

In both the idea of "progress" and the idea of enlightenment and modern revolution, of which it is the spirit, we see that the ultimate goal is to organise paradise in this world. But is it possible to organise paradise in this world, which is the ultimate goal in both the idea of 'progress' and the idea of the Enlightenment and modern revolution? Or is it an illusion that ends in chaos, destruction, violence and terror?

We have seen that the Enlightenment, which constitutes the spirit of modern revolutionary thought, is the intellectual foundation of a social project that seeks to free people from the shackles of the social communities in which they live, the Church, and to make them masters of themselves. The Enlightenment wanted to create a secular paradise in a world centred on "man". To achieve this goal, the Enlightenment gave absolute power to reason, to scientific reason. Through reason, which has unlimited power, it wanted to perfect both man and society. But while it wanted to create an earthly paradise, it did not realise that it was sowing the seeds of violence and terror

unparalleled in previous ages, creating Koestler's "darkness in the middle of the day". It would be appropriate to quote Adorno and Horkheimer's following thoughts on the Enlightenment: "The Enlightenment, in the broadest sense, aimed at freeing man from fear and making him master of himself. But the fully enlightened earth bears the signs of a triumphant catastrophe". (Koestler, 2014: 158).

It should be noted, however, that trying to explain the tragic parts of the Enlightenment does not mean overlooking or neglecting the developments it achieved. If this is done, the debate itself becomes a myth and loses its power. Although the idea of perfecting human life and society through reason and science is impossible, such an attempt has led to many improvements in human life and society. Therefore, we have to accept that the Enlightenment does not have a single face, but many faces. However, in line with our study, we try to explain that the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the idea of progress that shaped it also carried the seeds of destruction, terror and great catastrophes on one side. Yes, there have been many amazing developments with progress, but we must also point out that the idea of progress itself has also led to great disasters and inhuman practices that have never been realised in history. History may be the history of progress, but it is also the history of decline. It is obvious that the movement of progress itself brings regression (Swift, 2007: 131-135).

In the Middle Ages, people were enlightened by the light of God; to be a better person was to be enlightened by the light of God. With the Enlightenment, we see that the light of God in the Middle Ages was replaced by the light of reason. According to the progressives and modern revolutionaries, it is the light of reason that enlightens man, that makes him perfect. Indeed, the light of reason has enlightened man in some respects. But every light also creates its own darkness. "Wherever there is light," says Arslan, "there is also shadow. (Arslan, 2012: 32-33).

While the Enlightenment idea of progress sought to organise paradise in this world with the light of reason, it also revealed its own darkness, a darkness never before experienced in the world. Such a darkness that it even obscured its own light. "The darkness of the Enlightenment," says Nietzsche,

"was greater than the redeeming, illuminating usefulness that led to its movement" and, he continues, "threw us into an amoral, inhuman world" (Nietzsche, 1966: 126). Porter expresses this dark dimension, which suppresses the light of Enlightenment reason, as follows:

"The belief that reason alone could provide all knowledge about man, society and nature; that it could, after a critique of the political and religious status quo, lay the foundations for building a glorious future, sowed the seeds of all kinds of dangers, leading to the great crimes against humanity that have been or will be committed, most notably the French Revolution" (Porter, 1990: 2).

Enlightenment thought, and the idea of progress that shaped Enlightenment thought, contains the seeds of violence and terror that the world has never seen before in its history. Terror is an integral part of the Enlightenment idea of "progress" that remains in the background of the goal of creating a "perfect" society. Terror is a way of creating a new society, a way of shaping a new man; a way that sacrifices the lives of millions of people in order to achieve its goal (Merleau-Ponty, 1969: 117). Therefore, we can say that the Enlightenment idea of 'progress' and the modern idea of revolution that it shaped are essentially a combination of rejection of the past, new beginning and terror. In other words, terrorism is the third character of the Enlightenment idea of "progress", which remains in the background of the two characters "rejection of the past" and "new beginning" (Eisensadt, 2008: 42).

The explanation of why the Enlightenment idea of "progress" carries the seeds of destruction and terrorist practices can be found in the source of Enlightenment itself. As we mentioned above, enlightenment is an attempt to construct one's own truth and to organise paradise in this world. While the enlightened man wanted to construct his own truth, to organise paradise in this world, he tried to achieve this through reason. It should be noted that it was this anthropocentric understanding of the Enlightenment and of reason, the Archimedes of this understanding, that caused the Enlightenment thought to lead to great destruction and terror. Since both man himself, who wants to organise paradise in this world, and reason, scientific reason, which will guide

man on this path, have such limited qualities that they cannot organise paradise in this world, there is no doubt that whenever they exceed these limits, they will lead to destructive consequences and great disasters.

In our effort to uncover the seeds of violence and terror in the Enlightenment mind, we will take Hume's views as our centre. The reason we focus on Hume is not only because of Hume's demonstration of the limits of reason, but also because of his influence on Burke, who plays an important role in our critique of the French Revolution of 1789. Hume played a very important role in the formation of Burke's thought by showing the limits of reason, by revealing the seeds of terror that reason carries within itself, and by drawing attention to the importance of established institutions and habits against the absolute power of reason (Sabine, 1961: 590-620).

Hume was, in Wilson's words, "an Enlightenment philosopher who turned the weapons of the Enlightenment back on the Enlightenment itself". In particular, Hume attacked the Enlightenment's idea of progress. According to Hume, the "in infinitum progress" that characterised the Enlightenment and modern revolutionary thought was not possible. Hume sees the efforts of philosophers to create an artificial happiness and to organise heaven in this world with the rules of reason alone as great nonsense (Hume, 2017: 33-34). In this way, he opposes the mechanical philosophy that puts man at the centre and claims to be able to reconstruct the whole world through reason, scientific reason. We see that the main reason for this opposition is the limitations of man and of reason, which is the only guide for man. According to Hume, any attempt by man, guided by limited reason, to go beyond its limits leads to chaos and violence and throws the world into disorder (Hayek, 1963: 699).

If we look at the French Revolution of 1789, both the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary subject in 1789, and the "so-called" people, the revolutionary subject in 1792, agree that society and the individual can be perfected under the guidance of reason. The French revolutionaries of 1789, opposed to the values and traditions of the past and loyal to Enlightenment reason, believed that they could solve all problems and build a perfect new society through reason (Hobsbawm, 2009: 54-57). The French Revolution of 1789, which placed reason at its centre, first implemented this project through the bourgeoisie.

The development of reason is the development of the bourgeoisie. As the bourgeoisie developed, people stopped believing in supernatural powers and started believing in reason. That is why the French Revolution of 1789, based on reason, wanted to realise its social project primarily with the bourgeoisie. The 14th of July 1789 is the victory of the bourgeoisie; the Constituent Assembly is the legislative body of the bourgeoisie; the National Guard, the guardian of the revolution, is the armed force of the bourgeoisie (Soboul, 1989: 11-12).

However, the French Revolution of 1789 dealt its greatest blow by brutally attacking the God of Catholic Christianity, the Church. For the revolutionaries, Christianity in general, and the Church in particular, was the fundamental dynamic of the imperfect past and present. Therefore, if a perfect future was to be built, Christianity and the Church had to be destroyed. In fact, the Revolution did just that. But the success of the revolutionaries in this work of destruction was actually their punishment. For this attack was the main reason why the revolution led to the crisis. The greater and more successful an attack, the greater and more destructive its consequences. Since Christianity and the Church were the guarantors of order in feudal times, their destruction also brought great social and political depression (Burke, 1957: 66).

In medieval Western Europe, "covered with the white mantle of the Church", the Church, with the privilege of religion and the administration of social security, was the guarantor of the divine order, with its unique discipline and hierarchy. The important roles it played in many important areas, especially in the social, cultural and economic spheres, earned the Church this position. Socially, as the protector of the city and the father of the poor, the Church is the main institution that meets the basic needs of society by organising private donations and official aid. Economically, the Church played a pioneering role in the development of construction and was the most important economic unit of the period, assuming the role of a lending institution. Culturally, the Church, which had both economic and spiritual superiority in a system based on hierarchy, took over the functions of the state and determined the cultural life of the period by claiming the right to

education and training at all stages from childhood to adulthood in a society characterised by widespread illiteracy (Burke, 1957: 149-150).

Therefore, the revolution wanted to introduce a new religion to recreate the individual and society. This new religion to be created by the Revolution would have an identity in which there was a compromise between reason, the guide of the Revolution, and religious practices. With Robespierre's speech, which constituted the bible of the new religion, there was a transition from the Catholic Christian religion, represented by clergy and priests, to the revolutionary religion, represented by philosophers and political portraits. This religion of reason, like the sacred religions, created new rituals, new prayers, its own prophets, monasteries and festivals. Accordingly, cathedrals, literally meaning "the bishop's house", were transformed into temples of reason. Robespierre replaced the busts of Christ; Marat and le Peletier replaced the busts of St Pierre and St Denis (Robespierre, 2008: 104-105).

In identifying rational moral principles, Durkheim first looks at the qualities of primitive and Christian societies that make morality transcendent. Having identified the transcendent qualities of morality in primitive and Christian societies, he reformulates these moral qualities in rational terms. Durkheim's attitude to religion is actually a critique of the Enlightenment. Durkheim gives religion a socially common and practical meaning, translating the sacred into a rational language, rather than negating religious elements or identifying the sacred with theology and rejecting it. According to Durkheim, the main problem in society is the problem of moral misery that occurs with the end of mechanical solidarity (Durkheim, 2016: 133-134).

To show what these moral principles are and how they ensure solidarity and integration, Durkheim returns to the first form of religious life. Durkheim discusses how divine thought contains these two moral elements as follows: "The believer believes that he is obliged to behave in a certain way, but not by material compulsion. His sovereignty over consciousness derives not so much from the privilege of physical superiority as from the power of spiritual authority with which he is endowed... When we hear pressure of a spiritual nature, a feeling of respect arises. What determines us then is not the favourable or unfavourable aspects of the attitude which is commanded or

prescribed to us, but how we conceive of that which is commanded or prescribed to us... God is not a power on which we are dependent, but a power which is also the source of our own power. The man who submits to his God, and therefore believes that he is with him, faces the world with complete confidence, with a feeling of increased strength" (Durkheim, 2010, pp. 291-294).

Durkheim's classification of moral societies is another form of Comte's law of three states. In attempting to construct rational morality, Durkheim created a hierarchy of moral societies, placing the rational moral society at the top. According to Durkheim, the first level of the hierarchy is the morality of primitive societies. The understanding of morality in primitive societies is essentially based on religion. People's obligations to each other are less than their obligations to their god. The morality of primitive societies is followed by the morality of Christian societies. With Christianity, man's duties to man increased and developed. Christianity slowly began to dissolve the relationship between morality and the divine by saying that man's main duty towards God is to fulfil his duties towards other human beings. And the next stage is morality in rational societies, where man has duties and obligations not towards God, but only towards man (Durkheim, 2016: 28-30).

Conclusion

In the historical background of the dominance of the progressive idea of history in the historical science and philosophy of the 19th century, as well as in the sociology that would break away from it, there are the theological-philosophical problems posed in Europe by the effects of geographical discoveries, long-distance trade, colonialism, and the effects of different types of societies encountered with the increasing possibilities of transport and communication. The unsatisfactory theological explanations for these differences reignited the theological and philosophical debates that had begun earlier in the context of the dualities of tradition-modernity, individual-society, religion-rationality/reason. The discussions in the advanced stage of this intensification led to the rapid adoption of modern thought by Western society, beginning with Descartes and culminating with Comte. In Christianity, especially in the Catholic understanding, the assumption that the

truth is unique and unchanging has led to the uncompromising rigidity of the European towards other cultures. From this point of view, the metaphysical thinking of Western man, which places him in a supra-historical and supra-social position, the neglect of the physical and material world in favour of an idealised understanding of the real world, and the emergence of dichotomies and dualities in thinking. In the ensuing process, the thesis of progressive history, as a thesis capable of filling many intellectual gaps, came to dominate society as a paradigm, and the dualistic and dichotomous understanding in question led to non-Western societies being placed in the category of backwardness in the line of civilisation. From a Western perspective, it is understood that the dichotomous way of thinking was used especially for the purposes of Orientalism during the colonial period.

Western thought managed to come out of the crisis it entered with the discovery of the New World with a new way of explaining time, history and society, namely the progressive understanding of history. Of course, the thesis of progressive history has gained missionaries at the level of states by leaning against the ideological wall over time in order to give a purposive perspective to the modern understanding of science. To put it more succinctly, thanks to the progressive thesis of history, which Western civilisation would see as the ideology of its colonial policy, it undertook the missionary work of this thesis like the reflex of spreading a religion. In fact, the dichotomies and dualities in the thesis of progressive history had a great functionality in terms of forming the philosophical background of the understanding of self and other. So much so, in fact, that the idea of progress has an important place in the formation of the West's sense of self, because the people captured in the colonies had different cultures in the process that began with the discovery of the New World. For the worlds that were discovered led Westerners to ask questions that were difficult to answer. The starting point of these questions were the existential crises that emerged in a bewildering and complex array of cultural differences encountered in the geography of the new world.

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